09 de Abril, 2014
Seminario Académico - Dual Labor Markets and Labor Protection in an Estimated Search and Matching Model

Fecha de inicio: 09 de Abril, 2014, 13:00 hrs.

Fecha de término: 09 de Abril, 2014, 14:00 hrs.

El Seminario se realizará el miércoles 09 de abril de 13:00 a 14:00 hrs, en la Sala P-301 Tercer Piso del edificio Placa de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios.

El Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Chile tiene el agrado de invitar a usted a un nuevo Seminario Académico:

 

 

Título - Dual Labor Markets and Labor Protection in an Estimated Search and Matching Model

 

Autor - Mauricio Tejada (ILADES, Universidad Alberto Hurtado)

 

Presenta - Mauricio Tejada (ILADES, Universidad Alberto Hurtado) 

 

Abstract - Temporary contracts are widely used in European countries and have proliferated in developing nations, in the last twenty years. They have been used to introduce flexibility in the labor market in order to reduce unemployment. Labor protection, in the form of firing costs, has also been extensively used to reduce unemployment with the difference that it leads to fewer job destructions. A large part of the literature that analyzes temporary contract and labor protection policies has treated temporary contracts as exogenous. Little attentionhas been given to the endogenous relation between the two policies. This paper estimates a search and matching model with dual labor markets in which the use of temporary contracts is endogenous. The model is structurally estimated using Chilean data and quantitatively evaluates the role of labor protection legislation and the use of temporary contracts in unemployment, welfare, and inequality. The results show that under the estimated parameters, both types of contracts survive in equilibrium. However, temporary contracts negatively affect the frequency with which regular jobs arrive, offsetting any positive effect of firing costs on unemployment. Finally, temporary contracts increase flexibility, but do not make workers and firms better off. Welfare gains are observed only if labor protection is very stringent.

 

 

El Seminario se realizará el miércoles 09 de abril de 13:00 a 14:00 hrs, en la Sala P-301 Tercer Piso del edificio Placa de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile, ubicada en Diagonal Paraguay 257.

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