Estimados Académicos y Académicas FEN,

Les extendemos la invitación al seminario que organiza el Departamento de Economía, en el que se presentará el trabajo titulado "Should Central Banks Have an Inequality Objetcive?".

Expone: Roberto Chang, Rutgers University

Abstract: Should central banks care about inequality? To address this question, we extend a standard model of time inconsistency in monetary policy to allow for heterogeneity. As in the standard analysis, lack of policy commitment leads to a bias towards socially excessive ináation. But the novel result is that, in the presence of heterogeneity, the bias can be offset by assigning the central bank a mandate under which agents with higher nominal wealth are given a higher relative weight than under the social welfare function. In other words, society should choose a central banker that is less egalitarian than itself, a result reminiscent of Rogoff's "conservative central banker". Our analysis underscores that including a concern for redistribution in the central bankís mandate can enhance policy credibility, but the details can be unexpected and should reáect the role of the mandate in overcoming policy distortions.

El formato será presencial y el seminario se desarrollará en la Sala P-305.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación