Estimados/as Académicos/as,

Les extendemos la invitación al seminario que organiza el Departamento de Economía, en el que se presentará el trabajo titulado "Regulation by Public Options: Evidence from Pension Funds".

Expone: Sebastián Fleitas, Profesor asistente, PUC.

Co-autores: Pablo Blanchard (UDELAR), Rodrigo Gonzalez Valdenegro (Boston College)

Abstract: We study the equilibrium welfare effects of using state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to regulate market power. We estimate a dynamic equilibrium model of Uruguay’s individual capitalization pension system, where a high-quality SOE competes with private firms. We find that the presence of an SOE reduces equilibrium fees and increases investment returns. Eliminating the SOE and replacing it with a private firm would more than double its fee and increase the fees of private firms by 8%. Reducing workers' inertia cannot fully offset privatization. Finally, direct price regulation outperforms SOE as a competitive force in the market.

El formato será presencial en la sala H-203.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación