Estimados Académicos y Académicas FEN,

Les extendemos la invitación al seminario que organiza el Departamento de Economía, en el que se presentará el trabajo titulado "Equilibium Effects of Health Insurance Selection on the Hospital Market".

Expone: Wei Xiong, Profesora Asistente, Universidad de los Andes.

Abstract: This paper studies how selection outcomes in an individual insurance market shape the hospital market. In a setting with horizontally and vertically differentiated hospitals, consumers who prefer high-quality but expensive 'star' hospitals are costlier to insure. Competitive multi-plan insurers respond by offering tiered- and narrow-network plans to attract consumers less likely to use expensive providers. However, enrollment in these plans reduces the average coverage that insurers assume at star hospitals and weakens insurers' bargaining incentives, creating a feedback loop that elevates star hospital prices and enlarges the premium differences between network policies. Using industry-wide claims and enrollment data from Chile, I estimate that insurers' tiered provider networks explain 18% of the observed three-fold price ratio between high- and low-cost hospitals. Eliminating network choices mitigates both adverse and advantageous selection on hospital preferences, shifts patients toward star hospitals, and reduces profitability disparities across providers.

El formato será presencial en la sala 1605.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación