Estimados y Estimadas Académicos/as FEN,

Les informamos que se realizará el primer seminario en el marco del proyecto ANILLO ACT210005 ICMD (Information and Computation in Market Design), del que forma parte Adriana Piazza, Profesora Asociada del Departamento de Economía.

En este caso se realizará una sesión doble dedicada al Matching.

Fecha:     9 de Marzo
Lugar:      Facultad de Economía y Negocios, U. de Chile, sala  P-305.
                Diagonal Paraguay 257, Santiago.

Programa

14h30: “On bargaining sets for exchange economies”
Speaker: Emma Moreno García, Universidad de Salamanca
Abstract: We focus on the study of bargaining sets for exchange economies.  This two-step conception of the blocking process attempts to inject a sense of stability and credibility into the veto mechanism.
We analyze the behavior of such a cooperative solution when there are restrictions on the formation of coalitions. Moreover, we introduce a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations. Finally, we address the case where the presence of a leader is required in the objection system.

15h30: "Coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities and random preferences"
Speaker: Adriana Piazza, Universidad de Chile
Abstract: The aim of this work is to analyze the probability of existence of coalitionally stable outcomes in matching problems with externalities.
We propose a general model that includes marriage markets, roommate problems, and Shapley-Scarf housing markets as particular cases. When preferences are randomly determined, the probability of having a coalitionally stable solution is positively affected by three factors: the prudence of coalitions when evaluating a deviation, the social connectedness of those that can react to it, and the incidence of externalities in preferences. At the same time, this probability is negatively affected by the number of agreements that agents can implement to block a matching. In this context, if agents  have a limited  capacity  to organize themselves into large  coalitions, then coalitional stability holds asymptotically even when individuals become less and less prudent as the population grows.
This is a joint work with Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación