Estimados Académicos FEN,

Los invitamos al Seminario Interno FEN que dictará la académica María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena. 

Título: Career Choice Problem with Partial and Sequential Revelation of Preferences.

Autores: María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena, Matteo Triossi.

Resumen: In contexts where only a short list of alternatives is required from students, there is no mechanism that is envy-free, individually rational, non-wasteful or efficient. As decision-makers, can we do anything to improve the results of the classical mechanisms? Inspired by the centralized admission system implemented by the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua in Managua (UNAN-Managua) we find that providing information about available seats during the process has positive effects. We analyze the properties of this mechanism and compare it with the Immediate Acceptance, the Serial Dictatorship, the Deferred Acceptance, and the Top Trading Cycle. 

El seminario se realizará este viernes 28 de junio a las 13:00 hrs. en la sala T-1002 de la Facultad.

Se solicita confirmar asistencia con Juanita Castillo (jcastillo@fen.uchile.cl) hasta el jueves 27 de junio a las 13:00 hrs., pues el seminario contempla almuerzo.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación