Estimados/as Académicos/as,

Les extendemos la invitación al seminario que organiza el Departamento de Economía, en el que se presentará el trabajo titulado "Affimative Action in Centralized Admissions: Evidence on Education Equality".

Expone: Ana Gazmuri, profesora asistente, UDP.

Coautores: Lisa Botbol.

Abstract: We study the effects of affirmative action quotas in centralized school admissions on socioeconomic segregation. Chile's 2016 reform introduced a nationwide centralized platform with a 15% quota reserving seats for low-SES students. Exploiting staggered regional implementation in a two-way fixed effects design, we find that the quota had no effect on segregation or low-SES students' access to higher-quality schools. Simulating counterfactual allocations under alternative quota levels, we find that slot-based quotas leave the allocation unchanged below a threshold (which Chile's 15% quota does not clear) and that, once active, their relationship with segregation is U-shaped in the quota size. We estimate a structural demand model to rule out alternative explanations, including preference heterogeneity and residential segregation, confirming the quota level itself as the binding constraint. Simulating municipality-specific quotas set at the local share of low-SES students, we find they outperform a uniform national policy on decreasing segregation while limiting distortions.

El formato será presencial en la sala P-303.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación