Estimados/as Académicos/as,

Les extendemos la invitación al seminario que organiza el Departamento de Economía, en el que se presentará el trabajo titulado "Financial Constraints and Cometition in Procurement Markets".

Expone: Andrés González, Profesor Asistente, Escuela de Administración UC.

Co-autores: Alan Finkelstein Saphiro.

Abstract: We study the role of firms' financial constraints on entry and bidding behavior in public procurement auctions. Our analysis leverages a reform in the Chilean public health agencies that significantly reduced payment delays to suppliers. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that reducing payment delays enhanced competition in procurement auctions by increasing participation from smaller, liquidity-constrained firms. Additionally, we document a reduction in prices for a subset of narrowly defined pharmaceutical products, highlighting the reform's potential to generate savings for public procurement.

El formato será presencial en la sala H-203.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación