Estimados/as Académicos/as,

Les extendemos la invitación al seminario que organiza el Departamento de Economía, en el que se presentará el trabajo titulado "Oligopsony and Collective Bargaining".

Expone: Matthew Weinberg, Ohio State University (OSU).

Abstract: Employers facing limited labor market competition may suppress wages below socially optimal levels. Unions can counteract wage suppression through collective bargaining, though they may also push wages above the socially optimal level and lead to job rationing. To assess these forces, we estimate a structural model of labor supply, labor demand, and Nash-in-Nash bargaining over wages between local teacher unions and school districts in Pennsylvania’s K-12 public school system from 2013 to 2020. We compare negotiated equilibrium wages and employment to oligopsony wage posting and social planner scenarios. On average, oligopsony reduces wages 7 percent below the social optimum, while collective bargaining raises wages 8 percent above the optimum. Averages mask substantial district-level heterogeneity driven by bargaining power variation. Twenty-seven percent of schools have negotiated salaries below the social optimum due to cross-district externalities, where high salaries at one school cause hiring reductions that increase labor supply elsewhere.

El formato será presencial en la sala P-303.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación