Estimados/as Académicos/as,

Les extendemos la invitación al seminario que organiza el Departamento de Economía, en el que se presentará el trabajo titulado "Equilibrium effects of competition on solar photovoltaic demand and pricing".

Expone: Stefan Lamp, profesor asistente, Universidad Católica.

Abstract: Procurement auctions are widely used by governments to contract firms for goods, services, and the implementation of public programs. However, awarding exclusive implementation rights to a single firm may distort equilibrium market outcomes both during the program and in the post-procurement period, even in case there is free entry from competitors. This study uses data from a field experiment that varies the competitive environment in the residential solar photovoltaic (PV) market to investigate such effects. Our results show that assigning a program to multiple firms rather than a single firm - selected through a competitive auction - affects market concentration, lowers equilibrium market prices, and increases total demand during and after the intervention. Based on these results, we estimate a structural model of solar PV demand and installers' bidding and pricing decisions. We find that the observed price differences are driven by differences in installers' markups, not costs. These findings suggest that upfront competition alone does not necessarily lead to comparable outcomes as market competition.

El formato será presencial en la sala T-1605.

Saludos cordiales,

Dirección de Investigación