El Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Chile tiene el agrado de invitar a usted a un nuevo Seminario Académico:

Título - Releasing Information in Competing Auctions

Presenta - Cristian Troncoso (Universidad Diego Portales)

Autores - Cristian Troncoso (Universidad Diego Portales)

Abstract - This paper studies the incentives faced by competing auctioneers who can release information to prospective bidders before bidders choose trading partners. We show that under mild condition on the distribution of bidders' valuations, the game possesses a unique equilibrium in which both sellers release all available information. This result holds independently of the number of bidders, which contrasts with previous findings in the literature where full disclosure of information is never optimal for a monopolist if there are two bidders in the market. We also examine the effects of introducing reserve prices and find that the game always supports an efficient equilibrium with full disclosure of information. Thus, our findings suggests that competition among auctioneers may be sufficient not only to improve informational efficiency relatively to monopoly but also to limit sellers' ability to extract the surplus that information generates.

El  Seminario  se realizará el miércoles 01 de octubre de 13:30 a 14.30 hrs, en  la Sala P-307 Tercer Piso del edificio Placa de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile, ubicada en Diagonal Paraguay 257.