El Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Chile tiene el agrado de invitar a usted a un nuevo Seminario Académico:

Título - Dynamic Oligopoly with Incomplete Information

Autores - Alessandro Bonatti (MIT Sloan School of Management), Juuso Toikka (MIT Sloan School of Management), Gonzalo Cisternas (MIT Sloan School of Management)

Presentador -  Gonzalo Cisternas

Resumen - We consider signaling and learning dynamics in a Cournot oligopoly where firms have private information about their production costs and only observe the market price, which is subject to unobservable demand shocks. A strategy profile is Markov if it depends on the history of play only through the firms’ beliefs about costs and calendar time. We derive a representation of symmetric linear Markov strategies, and characterize equilibria in strategies of this form. In every such Markov equilibrium, given long enough horizon, play converges to the static complete information outcome for the realized costs, but each firm only learns its competitors’ average cost. The weights assigned to private and public information under the equilibrium strategies are non-monotone over time. We explain this by decomposing incentives into signaling and learning, and discuss implications for prices, quantities, and profits. Signaling depresses prices below their complete information levels, resulting in the expected price being increasing from the consumers’ perspective.

El  Seminario  se realizará el miércoles 08 de julio de 13:00 a 14:00 hrs, en  la Sala P-307 Tercer Piso del edificio Placa de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile, ubicada en Diagonal Paraguay 257.