El Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Chile tiene el agrado de invitar a usted al siguiente seminario académico:

Título - Meritocracy, Egalitarianism and the Stability of Majoritarian Organizations

Autores - Salvador Barberá (MOVE, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE), Carmen Bebiá (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona and Barcelona GSE), Clara Ponsatí (Institut d’ Anlalisi Economica- CSIC and Barcelona GSE).

Presenta - Clara Ponsatí (Institut d’ Anlalisi Economica- CSIC and Barcelona GSE).

Abstract - Egalitarianism and meritocracy are competing principles to distribute the joint benefitts of cooperation. We examine the consequences of letting members of society vote between those two principles, in a context where groups of a certain size must be formed in order for individuals to become productive. Our setup induces a hedonic game of coalition formation. We study the existence of core stable partitions (organizational structures) of this game. We show that the inability of voters to commit to one distributional rule or another is a potential source of instability. But we also prove that, when stable organizational structures exist, they may be rich in form, and di§erent than those predicted by alternative models of group formation. Nonsegregated groups may arise within core stable structures. Stability is also compatible with the coexistence of meritocratic and egalitarian groups. These phenomena are robust, and persist under alternative variants of our initial model.

El Seminario se realizará el miércoles 18 de diciembre de 13:00 a 14:00 hrs, en la Sala P-301 Tercer Piso del edificio Placa de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile, ubicada en Diagonal Paraguay 257.

Esperando contar con su asistencia, les saluda cordialmente,

Pamela Fuentes O.