El Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Chile tiene el agrado de invitar a usted a un nuevo Seminario Académico:

Título: “The Deterrence Role of Supreme Audit Institutions: Experimental Evidence from Chile”

Autores: Eduardo Engel (Universidad de Chile) Tomas Rau (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) Andrea Repeto (Universidad Adolfo Ibañez) Felipe Jordán (Universidad de Chile)

Presentador: Tomas Rau

Abstract: This paper assesses the deterrence role of the Chilean Supreme Audit Institution (SAI) in year- end accounting rules compliance. As public agencies’ budget expires at the end of the fiscal year, they face strong incentives for spending their disposable budgets. Specific rules governing year- end accounting impose strict procedures for the accrual of expenditures not paid within the fiscal year (floating debt). However, the lack of surveillance over this rules and the systematic increase of floating debt has drawn attention over the potential misuse of the latter as a mechanism for increase spending at the end of the fiscal year. We randomized official letters from the Chilean Comptroller General directed to public agencies two weeks before the end of the fiscal year with general instructions about year-end spending accounting and an audit threat. We find a significant impact of SAI’s deterrence role on compliance: treated agencies decreased their floating debt by 34%. Furthermore, treated agencies also reduced their year-end spending by 33%. Procurement data analysis shows that office supplies purchases were particularly affected, suggesting that the avoided expenses were superfluous.

El  Seminario  se realizará el miércoles 29 de junio de 13:00 a 14:00 hrs, en  la Sala P-307 Tercer Piso del edificio Placa de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile, ubicada en Diagonal Paraguay 257.

Esperando contar con su asistencia, 

Saludos