El Departamento de Economía de la Universidad de Chile tiene el agrado de invitar a usted a un nuevo Seminario Académico:

Título - The Labor Market Meets Choking: Do High-Powered Incentives Harm Performance?

Autores - Rosario Macera (Pontificia Universidad Católica)

Presentador - Rosario Macera

Resumen - There exist noteworthy examples of high-powered incentives in the labor market. For instance, among top paid CEOs, yearly cash bonuses can amount up to 90 million dollars, while some pink-collar jobs in sales or real state pay 100\% contingent on performance. Despite this, experimental evidence shows that large-stake incentives can harm performance  due to ``choking", i.e., by impairing the worker's cognitive ability to perform a task. Using a laboratory experiment this paper shows that these negative effects are greatly ameliorated whenever workers can self-select into the task or engage in extended practice, as it is the case in the labor market. Building and testing a model of reference-dependent preferences, it is shown that one of the important mechanisms through which the market ameliorates the adverse effects of high-powered incentives is through selection on risk attitudes.

El  Seminario  se realizará el miércoles 26 de agosto de 13:00 a 14:00 hrs, en  la Sala P-307 Tercer Piso del edificio Placa de la Facultad de Economía y Negocios de la Universidad de Chile, ubicada en Diagonal Paraguay 257.